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FUTURE INTERESTS-RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES-CONTINGENT REMAINDERS IN THE ALTERNATIVE-RULE OF LonDINGTON v. KIME-POWER
OF APPOINTMENT-Prior to her marriage, settlor created a trust, reserving to
herself a life estate, with general testamentary power of appointment over the
corpus. The trust deed provided further that in default of appointment, "or as to
any part of said estate as to which the appointment may for any reason fail to
take effect," the property was to remain in trust to pay one-half the income to
her fiance for life, if he should survive her, the other half to her children who
survived or the issue of deceased children, and to pay over the principal when the
youngest taker living at her death became twenty-one. If her fiance did not
survive her, his half was to go with the other half to her issue, as provided above.
She married and survived her husband, dying in I935, and appointed by her
will the trust property to her residuary estate, which was to be held in two trusts,
one for each of her daughters who survived her, to pay the income to the daughters for life, then to each of their children for life, remainder over to the latter
or their issue per stirpes on the death of the last to die of settlor's grandchildren
living at her death. However, the trust to Mabel, one of the daughters, provided that if she died with only one child, then half the corpus was to be held
in trust for that child and the other half was to be paid into the trust for the
other daughter, or if it were terminated at that time, then to be distributed in
the same proportions as those in which that trust had been distnbuted. The will
further provided that if either trust were held void as a violation of the rule
against perpetuities, the principal was to be paid over to those at that time entitled by the provisions of the will to the income therefrom. At the settlor's
death, the question was before the court whether the invalid limitation to the
grandchildren brought the trust within the alternative stated in the will, so that
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the trust should be terminated and the principal paid to the two daughters,
recipients at that time of the income. It was then held that the alternative provisions of the will referred only to the future interests which might be invalid,
and since the life estates were valid, in that they necessarily vested within lives
in being and were severable from the subsequent limitations, they should be enforced, and the validity of the future interests should not be determined at that
time.1 Mabel is now dead, leaving one child, and this action is to determine the
validity of the limitations subsequent to her life estate. The Auditing Judge
found the primary limitation to Mabel's child void but upheld the secondary
limitation of one-half of Mabel's share to her sister for life, on the ground that
it was vested, subject to be divested, not later than the death of the settlor. Held,
both the primary and the secondary limitations violate the rule against perpetuities, and the property should pass according to the terms of the original trust deed
providing for an alternative in case the appointment failed. M~Creary's Estate
v.Pitts, (Pa. 1946) 47 A. (2d) 235.
The initial question decided was that for the purposes of the rule against
perpetuities, the time is to be counted from the date of the creation of a general
testamentary power, rather than from the date of its exercise. Abundant authority exists for this proposition,2 and it caused the court no real difficulty. The
other question is a bit closer, but it is submitted that the court arrived at a deci-_
sion supported by the great weight of authority and reason. The real difficulty
facing the court was the existence of several Pennsylvania cases 8 which seemed to
hold that in a situation like this, because of the preference for vested over contingent estates, the secondary limitation should be construed to create an estate
vested subject to defeasance by the survival of issue of the life tenant. This construction has been rejected by the American Law Institute in the Property Restatement, and the court cites the applicable section 4 of the Restatement at
length. The court further distinguishes the Pennsylvania decisions in the same
way as the Restatement did. 5 Those cases were concerned with the transmissibility of future interests where it would make little difference whether the limitations were construed as vested or contingent; while here, the nature of the
limitation is vitally important to the disposition of the case. If the estate in
Mabel's sister is said to be vested, she will take, since the divesting contingency is
too remote. The answer to this problem would seem to be found in the case of
Loddington ~- Kime: 6 "No remainder limited after a limitation in fee, can be
vested." Simplified, the limitations of the principal case are, to A for life, A then
having no children, to A's child for life, remainder to that child's children, but
if none, then over to B. It has been argued that the estate in B should be considered vested for the reason that the transferor might have made the same conMcCreary's Trust Estate, 328 Pa. 513, 196 A. 25 (1938).
4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, § 392 (1944); 2 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS,
§ 537 (1936); GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., §§ 526, 526a,
526b (1915).
3
Neel's Estate, 252 Pa. 394, 97 A. 502 (1916); Packer's Estate (No. 2), 246
Pa. u6, 92 A. 70 (1914).
4
3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT,§ 278 (1940).
5
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, Tentative Draft, No. 9, p. 202 (1938).
6
1 Salk. 224, 91 Eng. Rep. 198 (1695).
1
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veyance, omitting only the gift over to B, wherefore he would have a valid
reversion which would come into possession on the death of A's child, the gift
over to the first child's children being void for remoteness.7 Professor Gray, in a
note to the case of In re Mortimer,8 assumed that ultimate limitations of this
sort were vested, and argued they should not therefore be called void for remoteness simply because they followed other limitations void for remoteness. 9 His
argument was that such a rule would tend to defeat the intent of the transferor. However, in his third edition, he changed his view on this point, and
declared that the note was wrong, and that the case was correctly decided.10
It would seem that the rule of the principal case is one which in most instances
will work a just distribution of property. When a person makes a conveyance,
he normally acts upon the theory that all the terms thereof will be effective. If
a primary limitation is void because of the rule against perpetuities, a different
rule would mean that the taker under the secondary limitation would prevail
regardless of the actual fulfillment of the original condition, a situation entirely
without the contemplation of the transferor. By declaring the ultimate limitation void also, a reversion arises by operation of law, and the property passes in
the absence of special circumstances by intestate succession.11
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SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 532 (1936).
[1905] 2 Ch. 502.
9 23 L. Q. REV. 127 (1907).
10 GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., § 251, note 3 (1915).
11 In the principal case the property passed by the alternative provision of the
original trust instrument which provided for the failure of an appointment. An interesting question might have arisen had one of the takers under the will sought to establish
the alternative provision of the will giving the property to the persons then entitled
to the income, if the trust were held void as a violation of the rule against perpetuities.
There is no discussion of this point in the report, but it appears that the result in the
principal case is correct, for that provision of the will provides for the corpus to pass
when the trust is held void, which of course may be some time long after lives in
being plus twenty-one years.
7
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